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Abstract Criminal offenders may be offered to
participate in voluntary rehabilitation programs aim-
ing at correcting undesirable behaviour, as a condition
of early release. Behavioural treatment may include
direct intervention into the central nervous system
(CNS). This article discusses under which circum-
stances voluntary rehabilitation by CNS intervention
is justified. It is argued that although the context of
voluntary rehabilitation is a coercive circumstance,
consent may still be effective, in the sense that it can
meet formal criteria for informed consent. Further, for
a consent to be normatively valid (“take the wronging
out of the act”) under a coercive circumstance, the
subject to be treated must (1) have the sovereign
authority to consent, and (2) the offer-giver must be in
the right normative position to make the offer. While I
argue that subjects do have the sovereign authority to
consent to treatment, I also argue that inappropriate
offers yield invalid consents. Considerations on
inappropriate offers should therefore inform which
kinds of CNS intervention-based rehabilitation
schemes the state may propose as part of the criminal
justice system. Yet as I conclude in this paper, while
there are some intrinsic constraints on voluntary
rehabilitation programs, the main constraints on
voluntary rehabilitation are likely to be contingent
overriders. However, CNS intervention is not ruled
out as such in the context of voluntary rehabilitation.
Keywords Voluntary rehabilitation . CNS
intervention . Autonomy . Valid consent .
(In)appropriate offers
Preliminaries
Within the criminal justice system, offenders may be
offered rehabilitation as an alternative to imprison-
ment. For instance, they may be offered to undergo a
rehabilitation program to change their undesirable
behavioural pattern, as a condition of early release. It
seems humane, and pragmatically wise, to sometimes
offer rehabilitation as a voluntary alternative to
incarceration,1 in particular for recidivists who will
predictably commit the same type of crime over and
over again. In addition to traditional methods, such as
cognitive behavioural treatment (CBT), neurotechno-
logical options are on the table. And presumably,
increasingly so as we learn more about how the brain
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1 I am presupposing that treatment versus prison is a voluntary
option. Involuntary sentencing to treatment carries with it a
different set of questions than those addressed here. Further, I
will only be concerned with autonomous, legally competent
agents; not psychotics or others who are unfit to being punished
and therefore sentenced directly to treatment on paternalistic
grounds.
be altered and modified by psychopharmacological
and other methods—e.g. Transcranial Magnetic
Stimulation—that directly affect the central nervous
system (CNS) [1, 2].
At present, CNS interventions are mainly used to
correct abnormal or dysfunctional conditions like
depression and Parkinson’s disease. However, in the
context of voluntary rehabilitation we are discussing
treatment of conditions that are, to quote Martha
Farah, “medically unremarkable but socially undesir-
able” [2:26].2 Areas where CNS intervention holds a
promise to be put to use include anger treatment,
weak impulse control, sexual misconduct and bad
parental behaviour [2]. Hence the question arises of
whether, and to which extent, such interventions
ought to be included in rehabilitation programs within
the criminal justice system.
The main question to be addressed in this article is
under which circumstances voluntary rehabilitation is
justified. This is typically a question for consent
theory; to be justified, rehabilitation requires consent.
Firstly, it is possible that consent is not effective under
the constraining circumstance represented by a threat
of incarceration. By ‘effective’ consent I mean
consent given under conditions that satisfy formal
criteria necessary for consent to be real.3 Most
importantly, the subject must freely accept the
proposal; e.g., if coerced to “consent”, she is not
actually consenting at all.
Secondly, it is possible that there are constraints on
what one may consent to, which render consent
normatively invalid even if formal conditions for
consent obtain. By ‘normatively invalid’ consent I
mean a consent that fails to take the wronging out of
the act done to the consenting person, despite of her
un-coerced acceptance of the proposal.
Note that a consent which succeeds in taking the
wronging out of an act X only ensures that the
consenting person is not wronged by X. There may be
other overriding moral reasons why X should not be
done. E.g., the legitimate claims of others may count
in and render X all-things-considered impermissible.
A valid consent then, only gives a pro tanto
permission to X. I will largely set the issue of all-
things-considered permissibility aside in this article,
and concentrate on the normative validity of the
consent itself.
There are several ways in which a consent may be
normatively invalid; i.e. fail to take the wronging out
of X. First, formal consent-conditions may not
obtain. I assume that effective consent is a
necessary condition for valid consent, since without
it, there is no real consent at all. However, it is not
sufficient: it seems that some effective consents will
fail—in the coercive circumstance of voluntary
rehabilitation—to take the wronging out of the
act. One way in which consent may fail to take
the wronging out of the act is on the theory that
there are moral limits to personal sovereignty; that
the individual is not in a position to consent
because there are limits to her authority over
herself, e.g., that there are certain rights she cannot
waive. But the idea that one can wrong oneself is a
substantive moral idea and difficult to defend
within a political-liberal framework. I therefore
suggest we focus our attention on the offer. Rather
than argue that a consent may be invalid for the
reason that A does not have the authority to consent
to X, I argue that consent to X is invalid if, under the
circumstances, the consent has been inappropriately
asked. However, not all CNS interventions are
inappropriately offered.
Effective Consent in the Context of Voluntary
Rehabilitation
Distinguish between Cognitive Behavioural Treat-
ment (CBT) on the one hand and CNS interventions
on the other [2]. While CBT appeals to persons as
reasons-responsive by making it possible to reject or
accept strategies for changing one’s behaviour as one
goes along, CNS interventions bypass reasons-
responsiveness by interfering directly with the sub-
conscious mechanism itself; thus making resistance
and acceptance not just obsolete, but impossible.
According to Martha Farah, public acceptance of
CBT and ditto scepticism against CNS interventions
2 One may wonder if such treatments are not more properly
labelled enhancements, since they are not strictly speaking
medical. Still, I will refer to them as treatments since they are
arguably not improvements beyond normal functioning, but
corrections of behaviour that is deemed socially unacceptable.
For discussion of the distinction between enhancement and
treatment, see [2, 3].
3 I use ‘effective’ rather than ‘actual’ or ‘real’ to avoid alluding
to the contrast with ‘hypothetical’ consent, which is not an
issue here.
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may be explained by an intuition about individual
freedom4 as
(…) the freedom to think one’s own thoughts
and have one’s personality (…). In the anger
management class, a person is free to think:
‘This is stupid! No way I am going to use these
methods’. In contrast the mechanism by which
Prozac curbs impulsive violence cannot be
accepted or resisted in the same way [2: 28].
Moreover, Farah suggests that while it is mitigating
that the treatment is not forced but offered in a context
of choice—with conventional therapies and incarcer-
ation as alternatives—the implicit coercion in the
situation still represents a problem.
Farah raises two separate but related questions: (1)
does the implicit coercion in the situation undermine
consent? And (2) is CNS treatment compatible with
respect for autonomy?
To start with the second question; we must
determine what is the relevance for autonomy of the
distinction between treatment that can be resisted/
accepted and treatment which intervenes directly into
the mechanism. On the one hand, CBT does not seem
to be autonomy-undermining at all, insofar as the way
it changes the person—if successful—is by means of
persuasion, that is, by reason-giving which appeals to
the person’s autonomous acceptance.
Persuasion is the intentional and successful
attempt to induce a person, through appeals to
reasons, to freely accept—as his or her own—
the beliefs, attitudes, values, intentions or
actions advocated by the persuader. (…) All
choices made and acts performed on the basis of
persuasion are non-controlled (…) and autono-
mous [4: 262].
Arguably CBT is a type of persuasion, thus
understood. It changes the person in a way that is
not threatening to autonomy, but rather presupposes
and sustains it. No matter the result for one’s identity,
we may say, autonomy is not undermined by CBT
because the autonomous process guarantees an
autonomous result. CNS interventions on the other
hand, are not persuasions, and if we believe they are
compatible with respect for autonomy, this point must
be argued; in particular if the result is less autonomy
rather than more autonomy. I will return to this latter
point in Are There Constraints on what One may
Consent to in Voluntary Rehabilitation? Here I will
only argue that the fact that CNS treatment skips the
autonomous process is not in itself a reason why the
subject cannot validly consent to CNS treatment. An
act of consent is an act of “autonomous authorizing”
[4:235]. It is true that CNS intervention bars the
opportunity to say: Hey, stop, I don’t want to
continue this process. Thus CNS interventions
differ from CBT in that there comes a point—when
consent has been given and acted upon—beyond
which it cannot be withdrawn; one cannot change
one’s mind, as it were. Arguably, however, this is
true of many autonomous choices upon which we
act, both in general and in the form of consents, not
least in the medical context. If I consent to a
hysterectomy, I cannot withdraw my consent when
I wake up from the narcosis. It could be objected
that CNS interventions are different because they
affect the brain, which is “the seat of our selves”;
hence it is all the more important that the procedure
takes small and, ideally, revocable steps.5 I admit
the importance of this. While it does not follow that
CNS intervention is principally ruled out for the
reason that it affects our identity and that it does so
in a particular way by bypassing our reasons-
responsiveness;6 there is certainly a call for careful
consideration both of the constraints on such
interventions, and in the development of the proce-
dures themselves. I will return to this towards the
end of the article.
Granted that consent to CNS treatment is an
autonomous act of authorizing and hence as such
not incompatible with autonomy, let us return to
Farah’s first question: can consent be effective (real)
under the threat of incarceration? For consent to be
effective, it must be informed and freely given. I
4 The kind of freedom she refers to might well be labelled
individual autonomy.
5 I owe this point, and the phrase, to an anonymous referee.
6 The same is true of medical procedures that affect the brain,
say when the removal of a tumour causes permanent changes in
the brain. Of course, there is a difference between accepting
surgery to save one’s life and accepting surgery to address
criminal behaviour, but all I am arguing is that this difference
does not bar the permissibility of consenting to the latter.
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stipulate that the relevant consent is informed. But
what does it mean that consent is freely given, and
how do we make sense of this notion in the present
context?
Consent is effective only if it is the result of a free
exercise of choice. Beauchamp and Faden suggest
non-control—i.e. absence of controlling influences—
as the condition of free choice. Non-control is defined
by the ability of the subject to resist the influence of
others, and the degree of resistibility demarcates the
degree of non-control. Influence may be choice-
restricting or actually choice-facilitating. Only
choice-restricting influences like coercions and
manipulations are controlling factors in a sense that
may undermine consent.
Beauchamp and Faden define coercion as occur-
ring when “one party intentionally and successfully
influences another by presenting a credible threat of
unwanted and avoidable harm so severe that the
person is unable to resist7 acting to avoid it.” [4: 339].
In the present context, the coercive element is the
prospect of incarceration. However, it may be false to
construe imprisonment in this context as a threat of
harm. It is surely a coercive circumstance, having to
choose between staying in prison or undergoing CNS
treatment. The subject is not free to choose any option
she wants. But while coercive circumstances do
restrain freedom of choice, they do not thereby
undermine autonomy. Consider the cancer patient
facing the option of undergoing a risky experimental
surgery or being doomed to certain death from her
disease. She is clearly not free to choose whichever
option she wants (presumably, what she wants is get
well without risk), but she can still autonomously
consent to surgery. What would undermine her
consent as autonomous authorizing—short of tying
her down and forcing her to undergo surgery—would
be to threaten her with repercussions other than
natural death resulting from her rejecting the surgery,
or manipulating her by way of lies or distorted
information about the risks of undergoing or not
undergoing surgery.
In the context of voluntary rehabilitation, the
subject is already in prison. Thus the incarceration
to which the subject has already been sentenced for
her crime may be construed as a factual circumstance;
to be aligned with the death from cancer in the
medical example. The prison sentence is not a threat
made in order to make the subject accept CNS
treatment, but something to which the convict has
made herself liable by—ex hypothesis—knowingly
and willingly breaking the law. In contrast, were the
authorities to say “unless you consent to treatment we
will increase your sentence”, the convict would be
victim to manipulative coercion.
However, this assessment of formal consent-
conditions seems to circumvent a serious problem.
Consider, as a possible counter-example, the follow-
ing case described by Joel Feinberg [5], about a
proposal from the governor to the prisoner on death
row that his sentence will be commuted if and only if
he agrees to be part of a medical experiment. “This
translates as ‘If you do not agree to be an experimen-
tal subject, I will have you executed, and if you do
agree, I will commute your sentence.” [5:218]. This
situation is different from that of the cancer-patient
because while it is not within anybody’s power to
prevent the death of the cancer patient unless she
undergoes experimental medical treatment, it is
within somebody’s power to hinder the death of
the prisoner, independently of whether or not he
takes part in a medical experiment. The case as
described therefore makes the prospect of death
seem like a threat, rather than akin to a fact, and
the example appears detrimental to the argument
that effective consent may obtain under such
circumstances. However, we should maintain that
if the prisoner is in fact liable to execution, he by
stipulation deserves to be killed, and would be
killed, were it not for the governor. Hence the
governor’s proposal is not a threat after all, but an
offer.8 In the absence of a threat, it seems the
prisoner does effectively consent. What he does not
necessarily do, is give a valid consent; i.e. a consent
which is sufficient to take the wronging out of the
act (of experimenting on him). Arguably, the offer
here made is inappropriate for various reasons, and
as I will argue shortly, inappropriate offers fail to
take the wronging out of the act despite effective
consent.
7 My emphasis.
8 Feinberg concludes that despite appearances, this is an offer,
not a threat [5].
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Suffice it to preliminarily conclude that as long
as the sentence is fixed and transparent and not
subject to change conditional on which choice the
subject makes, he is not more coerced than the
cancer patient who consents to experimental treat-
ment as an alternative to certain death. Granted a
distinction between manipulative coercion (which
restricts autonomy) and coercive circumstances
(which restrict freedom), effective consent thus
appears obtainable even in the coercive circumstance
of voluntary rehabilitation.
Are There Constraints on What One may Consent
to in Voluntary Rehabilitation?
Presumably, the aim of CNS-treatment in the context
of criminal justice will normally be increased auton-
omy, by way of strengthening self-control, inhibiting
overwhelming urges, and so on. Yet it is not
implausible that the end-state of CNS intervention
could on occasions be decreased autonomy. One
reason is that the side-effects of a targeted interven-
tion may be such that they negatively affect the
autonomy of the agent (I return to this in How CNS
Interventions may Affect (De Facto) Autonomy). The
agent may be informed about such possible side-
effects and still agree to the treatment. Further,
autonomy arguably involves the option of doing
wrong, and the capacity to deliberately set aside
this option—or not—in the face of competing
reasons. Though perhaps far-fetched, it is conceiv-
able that it is in the state’s interest to have a
population of non-autonomous Moral Saints rather
than a population of autonomous wrong-doers, and
that the state could therefore push for interventions
that decrease autonomy on this score. Admittedly
the first possibility is most realistic, but both
possibilities make it worthwhile to address not just
the question of consent to autonomy-increasing
treatment, but the harder case of consent to
autonomy-decreasing treatment.
Granted that effective consent may be (formally)
obtained in the context of voluntary rehabilitation,
let us now move on to the question of whether
there are normative constraints on what one may
consent to. As suggested above, such constraints
are sometimes framed as limitations on the sub-
ject’s authority; i.e., of duties towards self. E.g., on
a Kantian view an agent has certain duties towards
Humanity in her own person, which are morally
binding on her choices. She is no more permitted to
treat herself as a mere means than to treat others as
a mere means, say, by killing herself out of “self-
love” [6:1,013–1,014]. Similarly, J S Mill believed
that the individual cannot have a right to self-
enslavement [7].9
It may be morally the case that there are duties
towards self. But within the legal-political context of
the criminal justice system, where the issue of
voluntary rehabilitation must be addressed, Kantian,
Millian or similar comprehensive and disputed doc-
trines must be relegated to the private domain.10 They
should not be made the basis of public institutions [8].
Feinberg’s discussion of autonomy is helpful in this
context:
Should persons be permitted to consent to
treatment that is likely to diminish their
freedom by restricting their future options
irrevocably, for the sake of a good they have
come to value more than their freedom? On
the assumption that consent can be fully
voluntary in such circumstances, it would be
to respect an individual’s choice to permit
him his (…) manipulative treatment, and it
would violate his autonomy to deny it for
what we take to be his “own good”. An
autonomous being has the right to make even
unreasonable decisions determining his own
lot in life, provided only that his decisions
are truly voluntary (hence truly his own) and
do not injure or limit the freedom of others
[5:67].
Feinberg helpfully distinguishes between de facto
autonomy (internal and external conditions for exer-
cising autonomy) and de jure autonomy. De jure
autonomy equals the sovereign right to self-
government, and cannot be constrained at all. For
that reason, he claims, de jure autonomy includes the
9 “By selling himself for a slave, he abdicates his liberty; he
foregoes any future use of it beyond that single act. He
therefore defeats, in his own case, the very purpose which is the
justification of allowing him to dispose of himself” [7:1,107]
10 The Kantian or Millian is free to decline the offer of
treatment.
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right to give up one’s capacity for autonomy (aka the
actual condition of self-government), for whatever
reasons one has. If we take de jure autonomy
seriously, there seems to be no reason why a
sovereign agent may not consent to autonomy-
undermining treatment.
However, I cannot consent to renouncing my
duties, because my duties are not within the jurisdic-
tion of my self-government, as it were. “(…)even an
[de jure] autonomous person cannot alienate certain
duties, and the responsibility for what she does”
[5:78]. Presumably, what Feinberg means is that as
long as I am a moral agent I cannot renounce my
moral obligations. But the claim could be interpreted
in a different way. If I incapacitate myself as an agent,
I no longer have duties, and I can no longer be held
responsible for what I (fail to) do. Only de facto
autonomous persons can be bearers of duties and
appropriate targets of responsibility attribution. Per-
haps I do not have the authority to undermine my
moral agency, because that entails renouncing all
moral obligations?
To make sense of the notion that I might have an
obligation to stay a moral agent, we need to determine
to whom I have such an obligation. First, I may have
special obligations to stay a moral agent; e.g., as a
parent I have an obligation to make sure I can fulfil
my parental duties in the future [9]. Some people
then, may not permissibly incapacitate themselves, if
by doing so they violate the legitimate claims of
others. As said at the outset, valid consent only gives
a pro tanto permission; it takes the wronging out of
the act, but not necessarily the wrongness out of the
act. The legitimate claims of others could trump a
valid consent.
Second, citizens may have duties towards the state
(i.e. the democratic collective), which lie outside the
domain of their sovereign self-government. Citizens
may arguably have an obligation to retain a least
some de facto autonomy in order to fulfil their
democratic duties. If this is so, the citizen cannot
validly consent to de facto autonomy-undermining
treatment by reference to her de jure autonomy
because she is bound by an obligation which is not
a direct duty to herself, but derived from her duties as
citizen, and those duties lay beyond the scope of her
authority.
The problem with this argument is that if the
obligation to remain autonomous is ultimately a
duty towards the state, the state apparently has the
authority to release the subject from this duty.
While the duty to stay autonomous cannot be
waived because it is not within the authority of the
single subject to do so, the subject can be released
from the duty by the authority of the state; and,
presumably, the state also has the authority to set the
conditions for its forfeiture.11 Thus the state can
release the subject from her duty to stay de facto
autonomous, without violating her de jure autonomy
(consent is still asked).12 Whether it lies within the
authority of the citizen to renounce her de facto
autonomy, or she has a duty towards the state to stay
de facto autonomous—a duty from which the state
has the authority to release her—the result is the
12 We should grant that the State’s legitimacy as a whole is
derived from the degree to which it respects its citizens as de
jure autonomous, but this is of no help to us here. For instance,
while respect for de jure autonomy may render it illegitimate of
the state to deny suffrage to its citizens (even those impris-
oned), since the right to self-government arguably implies the
right to vote, it does not imply that the state cannot offer
citizens to renounce their de facto autonomy. All it implies is
that the state cannot take away citizens’ de facto autonomy
without their consent.
11 It could further be objected that it does not lie within the
authority of the state to offer its citizens to give up their de facto
autonomy, because the state draws its legitimacy from express-
ing the will of the people. And a polity without de facto
autonomous citizens has no will. The state is therefore not in a
position to offer its citizens to undermine the very autonomy in
virtue of which it acquires its legitimacy. It is true that the de
facto autonomy of citizens is constitutive of the democratic
state. Can the democratic state legitimately offer treatments that
ultimately undermine its own existence? It would certainly not
be prudential to do so, but the prudential concern only arises if
all, or very many, citizens were at risk of being turned into non-
autonomous “vegetables”. But we do not conduct that kind of
generalization when assessing the justifiability of incarceration
or capital punishment (arguably, the democratic state would
cease to exist if more or less the entire population was in
prison, or dead), so why should it make a difference in the
context of rehabilitation? The democratic state is not threatened
by the fact that quite a few inhabitants are not de facto
autonomous. There may be a threshold somewhere, but argu-
ments derived from democratic legitimacy do not seem to work
against the permissibility of the state offering autonomy-
undermining treatment to some of its citizens.
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same. There is no inalienable obligation to de facto
autonomy, and consent suffices to renounce it.13
However, it could be that moral agents have a
general moral obligation to ensure that they can fulfil
their future moral obligations, on the same basis as we
have special obligations of this kind [9]. If so, de facto
autonomy, as a prerequisite for moral agency, may not
be renounceable, either by the subject or the state.14
This is a plausible response, but I doubt it works in the
context. First, it is disputable whether we have a duty
to remain able to fulfil unspecified positive obligations.
It may well be that I have no right to turn myself into a
future killing machine or a child molester. That follows
from the harm principle. But renouncing de facto
autonomy is not just about renouncing the capacity to
fulfil positive obligations, it is also renouncing one’s
capacity for doing harm. If we believe negative
obligations not to harm beat positive obligations to
benefit, then the trade-off indicates that it is better not
to be an autonomous agent at all, than to be an
autonomous agent with a propensity to harm people.
Or to put it otherwise; if the price for losing an
uncontrollable urge to assault and rape people is loss of
motivation to support starving children in Sudan, then
it seems worth paying. That there should be a general
obligation to stay an autonomous agent, against one’s
will and disregarding of how one executes this agency
thus seems to be a much harder case to argue than the
duty to remain able to fulfil special obligations.
None of these considerations explain why a subject
does not have the authority to renounce her de facto
autonomy by consenting to autonomy-undermining
treatment. The first leg of valid consent therefore
seems securely fastened; personal sovereignty is not
constrained by a general duty to stay autonomous, all
else equal. Now, before proceeding to the discussion
of the second leg of valid consent—constraints on
offers—let us look at how CNS interventions may
affect autonomy in more detail.
How CNS Interventions may Affect (De Facto)
Autonomy
The result of CNS treatment may be both more and
less autonomy for the subject.15 Define autonomy as
the capacity to act according to one’s own decisions,
without the controlling influence of others, and to
form these decisions on the basis of one’s own beliefs,
desires and values. Enhancing the capacity to form
decisions and act on them, say, by strengthening self-
control, presumably increases autonomy. But as
mentioned above, interventions could also decrease
autonomy, by making it harder, or impossible, for an
agent to form or act on certain types of decisions.16
The capacity to form (one’s own) decisions and act
on them does not only track rationality and the absence
of controlling influences; it arguably also tracks the will
to act. ‘Capacity’ in this sense is not an inert faculty,
but a power; a motivational force. An agent wholly
lacking in motivation cannot be autonomous. Thus
CNS interventions which impair the motivational
capacity of an agent decrease her autonomy.
Assume a rough distinction between lower and
higher order pro-attitudes. Distinguish between two
ways in which an agent may be motivationally
incapacitated:
(1) She has a higher order pro-attitude to do X but
cannot motivate herself to actually do X. (2) She lacks
any higher-order pro-attitude to be motivated to do X.
14 I owe this point to an anonymous referee.
13 The obligation of the state to respect citizens as free and
equal—understood as political persons capable of having and
revising their own conception of the good; “to revise their
wants and desires” [10: 261]—could of course entail more than
respect for de jure autonomy alone. It could be argued that the
state cannot respect one as free and at the same time offer one
to give up one’s capacity for freedom; i.e., for changing on
one’s own accord one’s conception of the good. I grant that this
might be a counter-argument against offering globally
autonomy-undermining treatment, and I address this problem
to some extent in (In)appropriate Offers by the State. Despite
this, is seems that respect for citizens’ entitlement to their own
conception of the good generally entails allowing them to give
up their autonomy for some (to them) greater good (say, peace
of mind). Hence it seems that voluntary CNS treatment outside
of the criminal justice context is not permissibly prohibited. If
people want to change their behaviour by various CNS means,
the state should not make it illegal to do so. This does not, of
course, imply anything by way of morally obliging the state—
or anyone else—to offer such treatments.
16 Again, imagine the Moral Saint, who can only do good. The
Moral Saint is not autonomous since she does not in any real
sense form decisions on the basis of weighing reasons. Her
actions are automatic rather than autonomous.
15 In this section ‘autonomy’ refers exclusively to de facto
autonomy.
Voluntary Rehabilitation? 71
In (2), there appears not to be a problem. It is not a
problem (autonomy-wise) that I cannot bring myself
to be motivated to do X if I have no reason to be
motivated to do X.17 Is there a problem in (1)?
Suppose a sex offender undergoes chemical cas-
tration so he is no longer motivated to abuse
strangers. As a side-effect of the treatment he is also
no longer motivated to have sex with his wife. The
drug is not selective; it is all or nothing. However, he
wants to be motivated to have sex with his wife. It is
very important to him. Is the man now less autono-
mous, since he cannot be motivated to do what he
wants to be motivated to do with his wife?
The answer is, I think, that it depends. Say our
chemical castrate decides to have sex with his wife,
but cannot perform. If he had been forcefully
castrated, he would clearly be less autonomous; his
lack of capacity to act would reflect someone else’s
decision, not his. But given consent, the reason for his
performance failure is his previous decision to
incapacitate himself; a decision entailing acceptance
of the cost of not being able to do what he wants to do
with his wife.18 He has tied his own hands. Thus
despite the conflict internal to his motivational
structure, the castrate is still autonomous. To claim
otherwise would commit us to the implausible view
that if A binds herself by an informed choice of some
sort at t1, she is not autonomous at t2, if she at t2 has
a desire to do something which is ruled out by her
previous choice. But that is absurd. If A decides at t1
to have a child, A cannot complain at t2 that not being
able to go to Bali on her own undermines her
autonomy. Consenting to treatment which inhibits
motivation locally therefore seems not to make an
agent less autonomous, even if it rules out certain
desirable actions.19
The agent would be clearly less autonomous if his
motivational capacity was inhibited globally. A non-
targeted treatment which unselectively inhibited all
affective states could incapacitate the agent tout court.
An agent left with no desires strong enough to act on
is hardly an autonomous agent at all. The difference
between autonomy-undermining and non-autonomy
undermining treatment could possibly be explained
by global effects on motivational capacity, as con-
trasted to local effects on the motivational structure.
Yet we could imagine targeted and local inhibiting of
someone’s motivational structure having global im-
pairment as a side-effect. The person who takes sex to
be incredibly important may, upon losing his sex-
drive, also lose the ability to see the point of anything,
and hence lose motivational capacity overall.
However, as argued above, it is not given that it
does not lie within the authority of an agent to
consent to autonomy-undermining treatment for
whatever reasons she has. For some, being less
autonomous—perhaps lacking in motivation to do
much of anything—could still be considered the
better option.
This conclusion may seem uncomfortably permis-
sive and in principle allow for unconstrained modifi-
cation of socially undesirable behaviour. But it need
not be. In the next two sections I will discuss the
second leg of valid consent, and argue that consent is
invalid if the offer is inappropriate. On the basis of an
appropriateness-constraint on valid consent, we can
maintain that it is not within the state’s jurisdiction to
offer global autonomy-undermining treatment, be-
cause behaviour that is not strictly related to the
crime lies beyond the scope of state authority.20
(In)appropriate Offers
Acceptance made under a threat is not an effective
consent: “Your money or your life? Your choice!” I
will set coercive pressures [5] created in order to force
compliance aside. But also non-created coercive
circumstances can be exploited: “I will help you out
of the water if you give me all your money.” Here,
consent is formally speaking effective because there is
17 Unless one believes that the fewer life-options a person has,
the less autonomous this person is. I will set that issue aside
here, as it would make for a paper of its own.
19 It could be objected that even if the castrate is still
autonomous, he is less autonomous than before. But is that
true? Pre-intervention, his inclination to abuse strangers
conflicted with his higher-order pro-attitudes, so it seems there
was already a deficit in his capacity for autonomy. In fact, he
may therefore be more autonomous post-intervention, because
his behaviour now at least is the result of his own choice.
18 Provided, of course, that he was informed about side-effects.
20 I present this as the main reason, and focus my discussion on
that dimension. It may also be that it is impermissible for
anyone to offer such treatment to others because the offer fails
to respect the other as a moral person.
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no threat. In fact, it is an offer.21 Being in the water is
something you would be even if I did not make the
offer. Whether you decide to give me your money or
decide to stay in the water is your autonomous choice
(though of course, it is not a free choice, since your
freedom is constrained by being in the water). But is
your consenting to give me all your money a valid
consent? If it is, it follows that I am not wronging you
by taking all your money, and it seems that I am.
There is something wrong with the proposal; I try to
gain unfair advantage by your misfortune. It is a
coercive offer [5].
If the option offered is modified, it appears more
acceptable: “I will help you out of the water if you do
me a favour in return.” Here too I try to gain
advantage from your misfortune—I could just offer
to help you out—but I do not seem to be wronging
you simply by stating this condition. On balance, I do
not seem to be gaining an unfair advantage, since you
are also gaining an advantage; hence the deal looks
more like a transaction between equals than an
exploitation of someone’s misfortune. Though I am
not acting in a morally recommendable way, your
consent to do me a favour in return appears valid; and
when you later help me, say, fix my fence, you do not
have a complaint that I am somehow wronging you
by this. “You owe me one”.22 This suggests that some
kind of symmetry between the offer and the circum-
stance is normatively significant. The offer should not
be “excessively profitable” [5:252]. Still, I doubt that
asymmetry between the circumstantial option and the
offered option can fully explain what makes an offer
inappropriate.
Consider a case where A says to B that: “I will pay
medical help for your (otherwise dying) child if I get
to have sex with you” [5:238].23 On a common-
sensical view, the offered option is less harsh than the
circumstantial option, but the offer still seems
unacceptable, and not only because A exploits B’s
bad circumstances for his own advantage. If A says “I
will pay medical help for your (otherwise dying) child
if C gets to have sex with you”, it does not do much
of a difference, even if A does not gain any
advantage. This example suggests that certain offers
are wrongfully made in coercive circumstances,
proportionality-considerations aside.24
A further complicating matter arises when we ask
why certain offers are inappropriate. Ex hypothesis, if
A consents to X, A is not wronged by X. By
consenting to X A changes the moral value of X.
Thus there is (ceteris paribus) nothing wrong with
X’ing A; A has released B from the duty not to X, and
presumably B acts permissibly by X’ing A. If A’s
consent renders X morally okay, what is it then that
makes it inappropriate to offer X?
The answer, I think, is that the offer itself is a
wronging. It fails to recognize the other as a moral
equal. Exploiting someone’s vulnerability or exces-
sively profiting from a situation is generally inappro-
priate because the very speech-act is a violation of the
other’s fundamental claim to moral respect. If A is
already wronged by the offer to X, her consent to X
cannot take the wronging out of X’ing her.
The examples suggest that there are certain offers
that no one is in a normative position to ask of anyone
because the offer itself amounts to a wronging. But
there is another dimension to appropriateness as well.
Some options which B would be wrong to offer A, are
not wrong of C to offer D—even if the offer is
coercive. Special relations create special obligations,
but also special permissions. Consider an example: A
wife asks her husband to choose between his
gambling and his marriage. This can be construed
both as a threat and an offer: “If you stop gambling, I
will stay with you, but if you do not quit, I will leave
you.” The offer is certainly coercive. But it does not
seem that she is wronging him. Similarly, the state can
say: “If you do not serve the military, we will send
22 In fact, this may be true even if I do not explicitly state the
conditions.
23 Paraphrased.
21 Feinberg has a very sophisticated discussion of the relation
and distinction between threats and offers, and their implica-
tions for consent. For present purposes, I will just pick out
those elements that are clearly relevant to the question of
voluntary rehabilitation.
24 In this example, A’s offer displays that A is a bad person. We
could change the example to something like: A offers to save
Bs child if B accepts to have sex with C, in order to distract C
from setting off a bomb that would kill the entire city’s
population. In this case, A makes the offer for a moral reason,
and great good will come of it. However, while it might be true
that B should have accepted to have sex with C in order to save
the city, it is still a question of whether it is a fair offer to B,
given the coercive situation she is in, and hence whether B can
be said to have consensual sex. Moreover, it is questionable
whether A is in a position to make this offer to B at all. I owe
this example to Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen.
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you to prison.” What is special with these (coercive)
offers is that they cannot be appropriately made by
anyone else. The wife and state are, qua wife and
state, in a privileged position to make a certain kind
of coercive offers. But substitute the wife for the state,
and the inappropriateness becomes evident.
This suggests that for an offer to be appropriate it
must be made by someone who is in the right
normative position vis-à-vis the other, and some
offers will be inappropriate tout court because no
one is in a right normative position to make them. In
the dying-child example, B is not in a normative
position vis-à-vis A to coercively offer her to have sex
with him (no one is). This is what makes the offer
inappropriate, and hence what renders A’s consent
null and void.25 In the gambling-example, the wife,
and only the wife, is in the right normative position to
make a coercive offer.
(In)appropriate Offers by the State
In the following I will specify how the “appropriateness-
constraint” operates in the context of voluntary rehabil-
itation. But first a caveat: as explained in the previous
section, there are many factors that can make an offer
inappropriate, or wrongful, and hence fail to yield valid
consent. For instance, it may well be that an offer to give
up one’s de facto autonomy is incompatible with
respect for someone’s moral standing, and thus
inappropriately made in all contexts.26 But for the
purpose of this paper, it suffices to consider how offers
are inappropriately made by the state, also for
distinguishing between treatment that aims at under-
mining autonomy and treatment aiming at correcting
specific problems that may have autonomy-
undermining side-effects. As we shall see, it suffices
for ruling out the former kind of offer in voluntary
rehabilitation that the offer is inappropriately made by
criminal justice authorities, for the reason that it lies
outside the scope of criminal justice authority.
As Antony Duff has pointed out, criminal respon-
sibility is a matter of “who is answerable for what, to
whom” [11:19]. There are some acts for which we are
responsible to the state and hence must answer for to
the state, but many acts for which we are responsible
only to non-state agents; be if friends, spouses or
employers.27 I suggest that what citizens are answer-
able for to the state determines the scope of
behavioural conditions for which the state can
appropriately offer convicts treatment; otherwise, the
state illegitimately trespasses the borders of its
jurisdiction vis-à-vis citizens. Not all wrongs are
“public wrongs” [11], and not all socially undesirable
behaviours are the state’s concern.28
Therefore, only behaviour that is criminal—more
specifically, the behaviour for which the agent is
convicted in the particular case—falls within the
scope of what the state is in a position to offer to
rehabilitate. If, in addition to being a sexual offender,
a man is also in general an unpleasant person and a
notorious liar, neither of these are crimes; and the
state has no authority to offer him treatment for those
personality traits.
The appropriateness-constraint helps us address the
challenge to consent under coercive circumstances
raised in Effective Consent in the Context of
Voluntary Rehabilitation. The governor who offers
the man on death row to commute his sentence if he
agrees to a medical experiment makes an offer
beyond the legitimate scope of the governor’s
authority. The conditions attached to the commuting
of the sentence are therefore inappropriate (even if
formal consent-conditions obtain), and the reason is
not that participating in a medical experiment is risky
25 Consent is only relevant when the offer is made in coercive
circumstances; otherwise one is free to ignore the offer. Of
course, an offer made in un-coercive circumstances can still be
demeaning, and thus inappropriate, in the sense that it fails to
respect the other as a moral equal.
26 I was reminded of this important point by an anonymous
referee. Note that if this is so, the offer is also inappropriate if
given e.g. in a psychiatric ward. One could also think that
treatment that had autonomy-undermining side-effects was
generally ruled out in virtue of being a demeaning offer. But
imagine the paedophile who, in despair about what he might
do, asks his doctor for a chemical castration, and who accepts
the foreseeable side-effect that this might have severe impact on
his motivational capacity. To me it seems more disrespectful to
deny him treatment than to offer it.
28 A further consideration is related to treatments that create
permanent changes in the person. There may be limits to what
one can validly consent to on behalf of one’s future self. I will
not explore this thesis here, but it could be the case that today’s
citizen is simply not in a position to consent on behalf of her
future self, and making her the offer would be making the offer
to the wrong person.
27 And for some acts, we are presumably answerable to the
universal moral community.
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or dangerous. The matter would be the same if the
governor offered to commute the sentence on the
condition that the convict agreed to serve him coffee
every day for the rest of his life. It is not the severity
of the offer, but the inappropriateness of it, which
renders the consent invalid. Our intuitions on invalid
consent may weaken when the option is serving
coffee rather than taking part in a medical experiment,
but all the same; the offer is inappropriate because the
governor, qua governor, has no right to ask the
convict to be his servant, any more than he has the
right to ask him to take part in medical experiments.
Of course, it is presupposed here that the medical
experiment in question is not a form of treatment for
the benefit of the convict, but rather an experiment to
which he will be used as a means for the possible
benefit of others. It could still be a concern that the
sheer irresistibility of the prospect of execution makes
consent to treatment (which, ex hypothesis, the
governor is in a position to offer) invalid as well,
even if the situation of voluntary rehabilitation is not
described as one of threat, but as an offer under
coercive circumstances. What difference does it make
to the validity of the consent if the governor were to
say “I will commute your sentence if you agree to
undergo an invasive operation into your ventromedial
prefrontal cortex”? Even if the convict has made
himself liable to execution, there still seems to be a
difference relevant to consent between the governor’s
offer and the one made by the doctor to the cancer
patient: “This tumour will kill you unless you consent
to having it removed by surgery (but the surgery
might cause some changes in your ventromedial
prefrontal cortex)”.
One way of solving this problem could be to deny
the option of voluntary rehabilitation to convicts on
death row, for the reason that their consent cannot be
valid under the circumstance. This solution is a bit
odd, though, like saying: “Since we respect your
sovereign right to self-determination we will not offer
you treatment for the behaviour for which we will kill
you, since we are afraid that you might feel pressured
to accept (since we will otherwise kill you), and thus
that your consent to the treatment is invalid. If we
could offer it, you could walk freely, but that would
amount to wronging you, so we will kill you instead”.
One could suspect that this oddity indicates a deeper
problem with capital punishment. Without further
pursuing that line of thought, suffice it to say that
obtaining valid consent to voluntary rehabilitation is
at least possible within jurisdictions not practising
capital punishment (which encompass most jurisdic-
tions anyway). After all, voluntary rehabilitation is to
be offered as a condition of early release, implying
that eventual return to society is the final goal.
The appropriateness-constraint implies that the
solution (treatment) should aim narrowly at the
problem (the criminal behaviour for which the convict
is answerable to the state). A global motivational
incapacitation of an agent would of course solve the
local problem of, say, criminal sexual behaviour, but
it would “over-solve” it. A ‘problem/fix’-requirement
implies a necessity-constraint (rather than a
proportionality-constraint); ideally, the treatment
should not go beyond what is necessary in order to
correct the behaviour for which the criminal is
imprisoned. This does not necessarily rule out the
permissibility of offering treatment that may, as a
foreseeable side-effect, have global impact on auton-
omy, such as in the chemical castration-case discussed
in section 4. But it does give strong reason to aim to
develop targeted forms of treatment. Moreover, it
rules out treatment that directly aims at undermining
autonomy, that is, interventions that leave the subject
literally a non-agent. In other words, though I argued
in section 3 that one has the authority to consent to
autonomy-undermining treatment, the offer to under-
go such treatment may be inappropriate. It does not
lie within the authority of the criminal justice system
to offer to reduce convicts to wards, even if that in
some extreme cases of dangerous recidivists could be
socially desirable.
Now, it could be tempting to draw the conclu-
sion that if the crime committed warrants a severe
form of punishment, then the treatment-option
could justifiably be proportionally severe. One
could imagine that a long sentence deserved
warrants a more invasive treatment than a short
sentence; that the treatment offered to a serial killer
could, for that reason, be more invasive than the
option offered to a kleptomaniac.29 But desert-
29 The length of the sentence could possibly be an incentive to
accept more invasive treatment that one might not have
accepted if the sentence was shorter, because a long sentence
is arguably a more constraining circumstance than a short one,
but that is a different matter than proportionality and can be
solved practically (e.g. by only offering treatment when the
remaining sentence is n).
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considerations are irrelevant to treatment. Allowing
desert-considerations to play a role in determining
which treatments could be justifiably offered would
require that we justify CNS interventions as a form
of punishment, say: “For murder the punishment is a
full lobotomy”. That would require a total reconsid-
eration of the penal system, and a setting aside of the
fundamental principle that punishment should not be
‘cruel and unusual’. It would raise a very different
kind of debate about the role of the penal system,
and the justifications of punishment in general.
Moreover, if CNS interventions were construed as
punishments, they would not need actual consent to
be justified; punishment presupposes merely tacit
consent. By breaking the law, the perpetrator
presumably willingly forfeits certain rights, and can
be said to, in virtue of the criminal act, tacitly
consenting to being imprisoned. But the court need
not ask the perpetrator for her actual consent to the
sentence.
Summing up, desert-considerations are irrelevant
to voluntary rehabilitation.30 Treatment should not be
conflated with punishment. What should be consid-
ered is the fit between the problem (e.g., uncontrol-
lable violent behaviour that has led to a criminal act)
and the solution (e.g. inhibiting the propensity to
violent behaviour). The treatment should aim at
correcting the behaviour on the basis of which the
subject is convicted, not with an eye to punishment
warranted by the crime. Moreover, the treatment
should be as narrow and targeted as possible. Though
targeted treatment with the foreseeable side-effect of
negatively affecting global motivational capacity is
not inappropriately offered, it is inappropriate to offer
global autonomy-undermining treatment. The subject
may therefore be wronged by such treatment even if
she should effectively consent.
Conclusion
I have argued that in the context of treatment versus
incarceration, effective consent is obtainable even if
given under coercive circumstances. Granted the
premise that the subject has a sovereign right to self-
government, consent to treatment is also valid on the
one leg, even when treatment is (de facto) autonomy-
undermining, because such consent is consistent with
de jure autonomy. Consent in coercive circumstances
is valid on the other leg only if the option is offered by
someone who is in the right normative position to make
the offer, and lies within the domain of what that agent is
in a position to offer (the appropriateness-constraint). It
is suggested that the state may only offer solutions to
behavioural problems for which the convict is answer-
able to the state. This seems to rule out certain globally
autonomy-undermining interventions, but not necessar-
ily interventions that as a side-effect decrease autonomy
by negatively impacting on the motivational set of the
subject. Still, it gives a strong incentive to develop
narrowly targeted treatments. Finally, a valid consent
only gives a pro tanto permission to X. Valid consent
may fail to give an all-things-considered permission to
X if overridden by the valid claims of third parties.
Presumably will global treatment that has autonomy-
decreasing side-effects on occasions be inconsistent
with fulfilling one’s duties towards third parties. Hence
even if consent to such treatment is normatively valid
in the sense that subject is not wronged by it, the
treatment may still in some cases be impermissible.
While this constraint is contingent, it could be
significant in restraining public policy and practice.
That said, voluntary rehabilitation is most likely to be
guided by an aim to increase, rather than decrease, the
autonomy of subjects, and as such, this article offers an
argument in favour of voluntary rehabilitation by CNS
intervention.
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